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Abstract 
This article critically examines the role of Islamist state discourse 
and policies in the Kurdish region of Turkey. Academic works on 
Islamism often address settings where Islamist movements and 
political parties operate as anti-colonial and oppositional entities. 
However, this article discusses how Islamist ideology has become 
an instrument of governmentality to maintain and legitimise 
colonial rule in the Kurdish region of Turkey under the Justice and 
Development Party (AKP).  After contextualising the Kurdish issue 
as an internal colonisation process since the beginning of the 
Turkish Republic, the paper focuses on the AKP period to analyse 
the use of an Islamic discourse of unity and brotherhood and 
attempts to foster the rise of a loyal conservative civil society 
among the Kurds. Thus, it argues that the internal colonial 
paradigm remains fully relevant to analysis of the Kurdish issue 
during the last decade and that neoliberal Islamist governmentality 
should be understood as a strategy complementary to repression, to 
increase popular support for the government and marginalise 
opposition.  
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Introduction 
The Sykes-Picot Agreement (1916) and the colonial legacy left the Kurdish lands divided 
among four Muslim majority nation states (Turkey, Syria, Iraq and Iran). For decades, the so-
called ‘Kurdish question’ has involved repressive state policy and the struggle of Kurdish 
people for their basic individual and collective rights by different means, from armed 
resistance to legal politics.  
In recent years, post-colonial theories have been increasingly used in Kurdish studies to 
discuss various aspects of the Kurdish question, such as state violence and forced 
displacement,2 discourse,3 and identity.4 However, this paper proposes to use the colonial 
paradigm to analyse a neglected aspect of the Kurdish question in Turkey: the role of religion 
in state policy and practices.  
The Kurdish question in Turkey has become a litmus test for the Islamist political 
imagination since the Justice and Development Party (AKP) came into power in 2003. After a 
century of suffering for the Kurds under secular nationalist regimes in the Turkish Republic, 
during the AKP rule state-society relations in the Kurdish public and political sphere have 
been reshaped by intensive implementation of a religious discourse and practice to maintain 
the colonial rule in place for a century. Promotion of the idea of Islamic unity (ummah) and 
brotherhood via the media and mosques, increased financial support to Islamic civil society 
organisations in the Kurdish cities and the networks of corruption around them and new 
alliances between the state and Hüda-Par, the political wing of Kurdish Islamist Hizbullah, 
are reflections of the change in Turkish state policy concerning the Kurds.  
Furthermore, I claim that the notion of ummah and brotherhood in the state’s discourse has 
been used as a discursive tool to subordinate the Kurds in its colonial territories. Although this 
has been the case throughout the 20th century, recent political developments in the Kurdish 
lands accelerated and intensified the implementation of a religious discourse under 
conservative and radical regimes in the last fifteen years. The example of Turkish Kurdistan 
and AKP governmentality is a relevant case when evaluating the internal colonisation of the 
Kurds in light of the recent conflict. Religious politics has been the main component of the 
AKP strategy to cope with the Kurdish question in its territories as well as in neighbouring 
countries.  
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On theoretical grounds, this paper questions to what extent the Turkish state’s use of power 
in the Kurdish region can be considered as an internal colonial practice and what the role of 
Islamist governance has been in transforming and shaping the political space in the AKP 
period. Has the AKP regime created an alternative solution to the Kurdish question by 
adopting an Islamist discourse and practice? How has the AKP’s coming to power affected 
the continuous state of repression towards the Kurds? What role has Islamism played in 
enforcing and legitimizing the internal colonial rule in the Kurdish political space? This 
article argues that the use of religion by the AKP in the Kurdish region does not constitute a 
break with the colonialist stance of the previous decades, but rather seeks new ways to 
enforce and legitimise the ongoing colonial rule.  
The paper will consist of three sections. The first section will be based on a theoretical 
discussion on internal colonialism, post-colonial theory, state, violence and power. The 
second section will contextualise the Kurdish issue and state colonial practices within the 
history of modern Turkey, with specific focus on the role of religion and state repression. The 
last section of the paper will focus on the religious discourse and practices developed by the 
governmental and pro-governmental institutions in the Kurdish regions. While I acknowledge 
that the reception of this policy by the local actors is crucial to evaluate its political meaning 
and impact, the responses of the Kurdish civil society organisations (CSOs), political and civil 
actors to the Turkish state’s religious policies deserve a thorough analysis that is beyond the 
scope of this article. I will discuss them in a forthcoming article, complementary to this piece. 
The first two parts of this paper critically address theoretical literature on internal 
colonialism, as well as historical and sociological works on the Kurdish issue. The last part is 
based on research data obtained via ethnographic fieldwork in the Kurdish region of Turkey, 
in the cities of Diyarbakır, Mardin and Bingöl in 2015 and 2016. The selection of these cities 
was made based on an evaluation in order to capture a wide representation of ethnic and 
religious components of the research field: Diyarbakır as the biggest Kurdish city and the 
symbolic capital of Kurdish culture and politics; Bingöl as a conservative city with a majority 
Zazaki-speaking5 population; and Mardin as a diverse city of Kurdish, Arabic and Assyrian 
residents. In addition to participant observation, interviews were conducted with Islamist CSO 
leaders, members, civil actors and political party representatives.  
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Islamism and Internal Colonialism: An Unexplored Relation 
Islamism and colonialism are generally conceptualised as interrelated but antagonistic 
phenomena. The colonial structures and legacies in the colonial and post-colonial periods 
contributed to the shaping of Islamist ideology. Islamist thinkers, such as Hasan Al Banna and 
Sayyid Qutb, argued that ummah was a response to the colonial rule and corrupt secular 
regimes.6 Islamist movements remained as a form of opposition against colonial and post-
colonial states for most of the twentieth century and suffered from state repression across the 
Middle East under secularist regimes.  
In the political field, discussions around Islamism usually take place in the shadow of 
essentialist anti-colonial oppositions and feed on the vision of an imaginary golden age 
community. In this sense, it is not independent from relations of power and hegemony, and 
shields itself from today’s structural inequalities. Like all golden age imaginaries, this attitude 
relies more on fantasy than facts but is a way to convey these ideals to the masses. 
Although many aspects of the western colonial expansion over Muslim majority countries 
and territories and the response from Islamic ideologies (modernist, Islamist or 
fundamentalist) have been studied, most of these works focus on cases where Muslim 
societies and their ideologies are the victims of colonisation.7 On the other hand, the role of 
Islamism as a tool of power when Islamist movements take control of the state has been 
mostly analysed through dialectic between religion and secularism,8 or elite vs. popular 
classes (or new elite).9 This paper, however, aims to explore the interplay of Islamism and 
colonialism in Turkish Kurdistan, a region where Islam is the common denominator between 
the ruler and the population. It will attempt to conceptualise this case through the paradigm of 
internal colonisation.  
The concept of internal colonialism came to use in 1954, when the oppression of non-white 
South Africans was described as ‘colonialism of a special type’ by the South African 
Communist Party (SACP).10 In 1964, Malcom X delivered his well-known speech describing 
the USA as a colonial power, colonizing 22 million black Americans by depriving them of 
their civilian human rights.11 In 1967, discussion around black Americans and civil rights 
increased as Martin Luther King described black ghettos as American colonies: ‘The slum is 
little more than a domestic colony which leaves its inhabitants dominated politically, 
exploited economically, segregated and humiliated at every turn’.12 
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The concept of ‘internal colony’ first appeared in academic discussions in the late 1960s. 
Although a few writers like Harold Cruse13 and Kenneth Clark14 highlighted the significance 
of this phenomenon by employing the term ‘domestic colony’ in the early 1960s, the first 
conceptualisation of the term as ‘internal colony’ came from Robert Blauner in 1969. In his 
seminal article, Internal Colonialism and the Ghetto Revolt, Blauner distinguished between 
colonialism as a social, economic and political system and colonisation as a process that is not 
only particular to classic colonies but also widely recognizable within state boundaries.15 This 
approach has shifted the focus of race studies in the USA and created a basis on which to 
analyse various aspects of the structural inequalities between white and black Americans 
within colonial theory. Blauner formulated four basic components of what he called 
‘colonisation’ and distinguished the process from what we have previously thought of as a 
colony. The first component was to examine how racial groups enter into the dominant 
society (whether it is a colonial power or not). He observed that colonisation begins with a 
forced, involuntary entry. Second, there is an impact on the culture and social organisation of 
the colonised people, which is more than just a result of such ‘natural’ processes as contact 
and acculturation. The colonizing power carries out policy that constrains, transforms or 
destroys indigenous values, orientations and ways of life. Third, the colonised are governed 
by representatives of the dominant power. He observes an experience of being managed and 
manipulated by outsiders. The fourth is racism, as it accompanies colonisation practices in 
many cases.16 
Although the concept was initially applied to black Americans and non-white South 
Africans, today there is a vast literature on ethnic, class, labour and religious aspects of 
internal colonisation. Gonzalez-Casanova was the first to apply the concept to Mexico in the 
context of uneven development.17 Hechter’s work on Wales, Scotland and Ireland,18  
Epstein’s work on internal colonisation and its impact on education in Peru,19 Zureik’s study 
of Palestinians in Israel,20 Mitra Das’s work on Bangladesh and Pakistan,21 Goodman’s work 
on ethnic minorities in China22 and Etkind’s work on Imperial Russia and its internal 
colonies23 are some of many examples of the concept’s application.  
As Robert Hind explains, internal colonialism derives from analogies: the coloniser and the 
colonised, contrary to the classic colonialism where there is a geographical separation, live in 
the same country. However, an internal colony comprises the common features of 
conventional colonisation existing within the state boundaries: political subjection, economic 
exploitation, cultural domination and racial/ethnic conflict occur widely within internal 
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colonies.24 ‘The rule of difference’, as Partha Chatterjee describes it, is the main rule of 
governance in colonies.25 Hence colonies are places where structural inequalities have 
become the norm in economy, politics, culture and belief. In this sense, it is the norm that a 
colony be subjected to economic exploitation, but also to what Gramsci describes as ‘cultural 
hegemony’.26 As a result of cultural hegemony, the inhabitants of colonies perceive 
themselves as weak subjects and have a tendency to consent to the cultural and economic 
exploitation they experience as a result of colonisation. 
Thinking about the Kurdish issue through this formulation, one can easily assume that 
Kurdistan features many characteristics of internal colonisation. First of all, Kurdish people 
and land have been under a permanent ‘state of exception’ in the twentieth century27 through 
decade-long martial law rules, special administration, state violence in all forms, forced 
displacement and disappearances, impunity, impoverishment, uneven development, racism 
and discrimination and/or exclusion from high ranking posts within state institutions. Though 
it is beyond the scope of this article, a closer look at how Kurdish cities have been ruled by 
martial law governors (OHAL Valisi) or the new administration concept of trustees seen after 
the suspension of elected Kurdish mayors since 2015 would show the extent of internal 
colonisation practices.  
Despite the early example of the sociologist, İsmail Beşikçi, the Kurdish case has been 
under-theorised in the academic literature produced by scholars from Turkey. İsmail Beşikçi, 
who described Kurdistan as an international colony in the 1960s,28 constitutes an exception 
with his activist scholarship on the Kurdish issue. In the 1960s, Beşikçi first worked on the 
nomadic Alikan Tribe at a time when the state’s assimilationist policies were being 
implemented in Kurdistan and the very existence of a distinct Kurdish identity was denied. 
According to the state narrative, Kurdish was as a dialect of Turkish and Kurds were a 
nomadic Turkish tribe migrated from central Asia together with their Turkish fellows.29 
Beşikçi described Kurdistan as an international colony, referring to the separation of 
Kurdistan between four countries. Although Beşikçi has never used internal colonialism as a 
concept,30 what he describes in his work is very close to the above-mentioned characteristics 
of internal colonisation. Because of his scholarship, Beşikçi spent years in prison, his work 
was trivialised in academia and his example became an opportunity for the state to give a 
clear message to the scholars who would dare to discuss the Kurdish issue and/or describe 
Kurdistan as a colony. Hence, the discussion around colonialism in the academic sphere was 
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non-existent in the 1970s and 1980s in Turkey, although this concept did constitute the main 
argument of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) during this time.  
When the civil war intensified in the 1990s, Kurdish studies focused on evaluation of the 
result of state violence and its social and political consequences31 such as nationalism, identity 
transformation,32 forced displacement and disappearances.33 In the late 1990s and 2000s, 
Kurdish studies started to receive more attention from international academia and the 
relevance of the colonial paradigm to the Kurdish case began to be discussed. Özgür Sevgi 
Göral’s PhD thesis is a good example of how the experiences of forced displacement and 
disappearances in the 1990s and broader public and political discussion around these issues 
are conceptualised around colonialism and post-colonial studies.34 Gambetti’s spatial analysis 
of urban colonial practices in the de facto Kurdish capital of Diyarbakır,35 and Yüksel’s study 
of spatial transformations and neo-liberal practices in the Sur district of Diyarbakır,36 discuss 
how urban space is re-designed through several post-colonial and neo-liberal practices. 
Orientalism and post-colonial theory have also been used to analyse the AKP’s political 
discourse37 and the representation of the Kurds in public and political discourse.38 Moreover, 
the Kurdish political movement’s new shift towards democratic autonomy and its 
implementation in Rojava (Northern Syria) have been studied as a decolonisation 
experience39 or an alternative to the nation-states40 in the recent years. While all these works 
have contributed to reframing the Kurdish issue from a colonial perspective, little attention 
has been paid to the role of religious discourses and practices in the colonial project 
articulated by the Turkish state. While assessing the religious dynamics of internal 
colonialism throughout the Republican era is obviously beyond the scope of this article, a 
preliminary insight into the history of state-religion relations in Turkey is necessary to 
understand the specificity of the AKP period.    
 
Religious policy as a colonial tool: an overview of the Republican Period 
Although the creation of the Republic of Turkey is most often described as a modernist and 
secularist project, religion has played a major role in attempts to create a Turkish national 
identity. The secularist project of the Kemalists was not a separation project: it aimed to 
nationalise Islam and integrate it into the state apparatus. The caliphate was abolished on 
March 3, 1924 and from 1925 onwards, laws such as Law on the Closure of Religious Orders 
(1925), Law on Headgear and Dress (1925) and the Turkish Civil Code (1926) were 
implemented as pillars of the secularist state.41 These reforms especially targeted traditional 
8 
 
religious practices and authorities that were stigmatised as backwards and challenging to the 
new state authority. However, the secularist republic did not give up using religion for its 
purpose and the Directorate of Religious Affairs was established on the same day as the 
suppression of the caliphate. The Turkification of the Ezan42 in 1930 was symbolic of the 
state’s attempt to use Islam as a central element of the Turkish national culture in the 
making.43 
The Kemalist centralising approach to religion marginalised traditional religious practices 
and institutions but most of them survived in a less visible, often clandestine way. Resistances 
were especially strong in the Kurdish region. The first major revolt against the new regime 
started in 1925 around a Kurdish Naqshbandi, Sheikh Said, and the respective share of 
religious and ethnic motivations has been much debated in historiography. The revolt was 
harshly suppressed and followed by the forced displacement of tens of thousands of Kurds.44 
Yet dissent and uprisings in the Kurdish region continued in the following decade, 
culminating in Ağrı (1927-1930) and the Dersim Rebellions (1936-1938). Religious 
solidarities and leaders played an important role in all these revolts, which resulted in further 
repression and deportation. 
From 1920s to 1980s, the state discourse and practice in Kurdistan was based on an 
assimilationist policy; the existence of the Kurds was denied, tens of thousands of Kurds were 
killed, displaced, exiled and relocated in the Anatolian countryside. In this period, the state 
framed the Kurdish issue as a result of regional backwardness, tribal resistance and 
reactionary politics, pointing to the lack of education, the resistance of landlords and religious 
elites (sheikhs) and regional underdevelopment.45 Yet, despite the state’s attempt to suppress 
the traditional religious and political structures in the Kurdish region, South-eastern and 
Eastern Anatolia remained at the margins of the Republic.  
With a transition into the multi-party system in 1950, religion returned to the political 
sphere as a platform for political parties opposing the excess of secularism. The first Islamist 
political party was created in the early 1970s and ideologies such as the National Vision 
Movement (Milli Görüş) under the leadership of Erbakan and the Turkish-Islamic synthesis 
started to get an increasing audience. Although Islamist parties were able to enter 
governmental coalitions in these years, they had a limited influence on policy, as their term 
was relatively short and interrupted by military coups. However, with the 1980 military coup, 
Islam returned to the public space through the military junta, whose declared aim was to re-
establish public order and fight against communism. Although Islamist activists also suffered 
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from military repression in the first years of the military regime, Islam played an important 
role in the official ideology of the new power46. According to Jenkins, in these years Turkish 
society rapidly moved towards a more nationalist Islamist line after the coup, illustrated by an 
increase in votes for the nationalist and Islamist parties from 10.1% in 1987 to 16.9% in 1991, 
29.9% in 1995, 34.9% in 1999, 54% in 2002 and 66.2% in 2007.47 National Vision Movement 
political parties (Welfare Party, Virtue Party, Felicity Party), the central right parties 
(Motherland Party, the True Path Party), and the Nationalist Movement Party formed the 
backbone of this increase in support in the Turkish political sphere.  
However, the rise of the Islamists in the 1990s started to be considered as dangerous by 
political and military elites, which led to the 28 February 1997 post-modern coup.48 The 
successor of the National Vision Movement, the AKP, rose up as the central right and the 
National Vision Movement parties lost their public support after a series of political and 
financial crises, and power has accumulated at the hand of the AKP since 2003. With the 
AKP period, the conservative periphery completed its journey into the centre, assuming 
power in the form of a one-party government and remaining as such for the last 15 years. 
Islamism gradually became one of the main components of the state’s discourse over this 
period.49  
The AKP acted more sensitively with respect to the secular regime due to expectations of 
the European Union and pressure from the Turkish military in the first years of their rule in 
early 2000s. However, as its room for manoeuvre expanded in the later years, the AKP started 
to implement more openly Islamist policies.50 While the AKP power retains much of the 
nationalist ideology developed during the previous decades, its main originality lays in the use 
of religious discourse, practices and organisations as a resource to develop its political and 
economic influence. The Kurdish region has been one of the main targets of this policy aimed 
at legitimizing state authority in a politically contested space of ethno-religious tensions. 
While this state policy has sometimes been interpreted as a change of paradigm, especially 
during the liberal phase of the AKP rule,51 I argue that the colonial paradigm continued to 
prevail throughout the period and that the Islamist discourse of unity and brotherhood 
developed by the AKP is a manifestation of a colonial practice at the hand of an Islamist 
governmentality. In sum, what the AKP introduced to the Kurdish question is not a 
fundamental change in state paradigm, but a strategic move to employ a religious discourse of 
unity and brotherhood to surpass the ethno-political nature of the Kurdish issue.  
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‘My Muslim Kurdish Brother’: Islam as a tool of governance and legitimisation of the 
state’s violent practices 
The colonial rule of the Turkish state in the Kurdish region can be observed in many aspects 
of administration and everyday life. What Bedirxan observes in Diyarbakır is very much true 
for all Turkish Kurdistan: it is divided in two in a colonial manner, compartmentalised both in 
terms of space and its inhabitants. Almost half of the Kurdish cities are allocated to military 
quarters, barracks for the families of soldiers, teachers and bureaucrats and the office of the 
governor, which are usually built next to each other and very well-protected. The second part 
of this division is a death zone where no one has security of life protected by law and 
citizenship.52 It is a permanent state of exception where Kurds live under a constant threat of 
punishment, something never seen in the rest of Turkey. 
It is true that in the first years of the AKP there were a few improvements in the Kurdish 
issue in parallel with other advancements in society in general. Many scholars saw this as a 
paradigm change and proposed the Turkish model as an example for Muslim democracies.53 
However, the recent change in the Middle East politics54 and the role of Kurdish insurgency 
both in Syria and Iraq revealed that the Turkish model is not an example but a continuum of 
nation-state practices under both secular and conservative regimes. In the Kurdish case, 
Islamist politics do not constitute a divergence from colonial state practices but rather seek 
new ways to enforce and legitimise the on-going colonial rule.  
Through a few examples of internal colonial discourses and practices during the AKP rule, 
this part will analyse to what extent the notions of Islamic unity (ummah) and brotherhood 
serve the interests of the Turkish state. I argue that the use of religious discourses and 
practices constitute a tool of legitimisation for the state, which lays emphasis on the shared 
religious belief in Islam uniting the Turks and the Kurds.  
The Islamic discourse also provides an opportunity for local actors who are willing to 
benefit from state-originated wealth and political recognition. As well as repressing political 
opponents, the state offers an alternative pattern of adhesion to the Kurdish citizens, 
characterised by the rejection of Kurdishness as an exclusive form of political and social 
belonging. Yet the affirmation of an ethnically blind religious identity by this new state 
discourse is not exempt from nationalist prejudices, as emphasised by a Hüda-Par leader in 
one of our interviews: 
Another issue is that if you dig deep enough, you’ll find that the most radical of 
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Turkish Islamists is indeed nationalist. I’m not talking about nationalists. This is 
what the Islamists are like. Tie a Turkish Islamist to a lie detector and list places 
like Arabia, Turkmenistan, Turkistan, Kurdistan, Azerbaijan. As soon as you say 
Kurdistan their heart will beat in anger and the detector will react. Turks are 
prejudiced on this issue.55 
Here, I argue that the state’s assimilationist policies transformed into a new form where 
Kurdishness can exist in conjunction with a strong religious presence and articulate its 
political arguments through religious discourse and practices. Although this is not a 
progression in terms of Kurdish political and collective rights, there are several motivations 
that make this discourse and practice function in the Kurdish region. First, the Kurds have 
been impoverished over many decades of violence and discrimination in Turkey and their 
survival strategies are scarce. Hence, rejecting Kurdishness as a political identity or at least 
being ethnically blind provides some opportunities for those that do not have any other 
alternatives. It is not a whole new political being, but a ‘line of flight’, in the words of 
Deleuze and Guattari,56 where the Kurds find a new strategy to survive from the state violence 
at the expense of their Kurdish political being and national aspirations. Second, the Kurdish 
society living in the countryside still features a strong religiosity, in the form of social 
conservatism, popular traditions or loyalty to local religious elites like the sheikhs. The 
religious stance adopted by the state authorities enables them to benefit, at least partly, from 
this loyalty, especially on the part of the older generations. This policy has led to increasing 
conflicts and tensions between the religious and secular, young and old, rural and urban, 
educated and illiterate categories during the last decade. Finally, the Islamist organisations 
have played an important role in the phenomena of religious radicalisation observed in the 
region. Not only the Kurdish Hizbullah, but also many other organisations like Pro-Al Nusra 
and Islamic State (IS), whose civil society organisations (CSOs) have been very active among 
the youth since the Syrian War. The role of the state in the process of radicalisation is 
essential at many levels. Moreover, urban poverty, which is pervasive among the displaced 
Kurds, is also one of the main drivers behind radicalisation not only in Turkey but also in 
many other Muslim majority countries.57 Yet urban poverty does not lead to secular or 
religious radicalisation alone, but operates in conjunction with a series of other factors such as 
structural inequalities, state violence and politics of denial.58  
The AKP campaign for the general election in June 2015 constitutes a striking example of 
the use of religious discourse as a tool of legitimisation in the Kurdish region. The 7 June 
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2015 elections were a turning point in the history of democracy in Turkey, but also the 
beginning of a quick shift and escalation of violence after Erdoğan repealed the results of the 
Dolmabahçe Agreement in February 2015.59 During the campaign, the use of a religious 
discourse reached the highest level. One of the symbolic aspects of the AKP campaign was 
the use of a Kurdish translation of the Quran to counter-balance the negative impact of the 
rupture of the peace process. Erdoğan delivered public speeches with the Kurdish translation 
of the Quran in hand, praising the Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet) for translating 
the Quran into Kurdish and criticizing the People’s Democratic Party (HDP)’s attacks against 
the Diyanet. Although the translation had not been completed yet and still needed editing at 
that time, ten thousand copies were published for the election and distributed to mainly state-
appointed imams in the Kurdish region. Disputes over the issue continued as the HDP MP and 
professor of Kurdish studies Kadri Yıldırım announced that the Diyanet had contacted him for 
editing the translation but that the book had finally been printed without editing with the 
intention of political benefit in the approaching elections.60 The strategy of the AKP failed in 
these elections, as the HDP obtained the majority of votes in the Kurdish cities, including 
among the religious Kurds.61  
This was not the only occasion when Erdoğan, the AKP and their supporters in the media 
employed a religious discourse towards the Kurds. The use of the notion of ummah is another 
example of the attempts to legitimise the state authority and stigmatise the Kurdish opposition 
through religious references. During the above-mentioned electoral campaign, Erdoğan 
expressed his belief that his Kurdish brothers were loyal to their religion and they would give 
the necessary answer to Zorastrian politicians62 (meaning the HDP) in the election.63 One year 
later, as he was visiting Diyarbakır right after a four-month-long curfew and the destruction of 
Sur district in May 2016, in a meeting with Islamic civil society organisations the Turkish 
president declared that there was proof that the HDP members were Zoroastrians and atheists 
and urged his ‘Muslim brothers’ to choose their sides and make a choice.64 This injunction to 
make a choice is embedded in the everyday life of the Kurds who are constantly urged by 
politicians, bureaucrats, security forces and pro-governmental civil society organisations to 
distance themselves from their Kurdish political identity and adhere to the state narrative, 
according to which the PKK and HDP do not represent the Kurds, there are also ‘good Kurds’ 
who do not support ‘terrorism’ and that Turks and Kurds are all brothers of the same ummah. 
I have come across this narrative quite often during my fieldwork with Islamic CSOs and I 
have concluded that most Kurdish people are aware of this distinction and constraint. The 
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sentence “I am a Muslim Kurd and I do not support the PKK”, underlining the Muslim 
identity and the opposition to the Kurdish movement, becomes a line of flight for the Kurds 
who attempt to escape from the stigma of Kurdishness and reproduce a narrative based on 
Islamic brotherhood and unity.  
The division between a good and bad Kurd manifests itself through an Islamic discourse, 
in which Turkishness is explicitly or implicitly superior and leading,65 while Kurdishness is 
absent or stigmatised. As a result, even if the official denial of the Kurdish existence has 
ended, being no longer sustainable, the denial of the Kurdish issue as an ethno-political 
question has found a new ground in the AKP period, through the use of an Islamic narrative 
that relies on a discourse of unity and brotherhood. This brotherhood nonetheless requires an 
ethnically blind approach towards its own being and has to prove its loyalty on every single 
occasion. This loyalty manifests itself the best in the examples of Islamist civil society 
organisations and their state-supported activities in the Kurdish region.  
I will here provide some examples from local Islamist civil society organisations (CSOs) 
and their alliance with the AKP in the last 15 years. The data comes from two years of 
fieldwork in the Kurdish cities, including participant observation and interviews with 
members, leaders and recipients of Islamist CSOs services and activities.  
Since the early 2000s, the Kurdish region has witnessed a rapid growth in the number of 
Islamist CSOs66 in the field of humanitarian aid, education, student housing, human rights and 
development. Most of these CSOs operating in the Kurdish region are affiliated with a certain 
Islamic circle that precedes the AKP administration. While some of them are the local 
branches of the nation-wide Turkish Islamist groups, such as the Ensar Foundation, İlim 
Yayma Cemiyeti and Gülen movement, many others are affiliated with the Kurdish Hizbullah 
and other Kurdish Islamist groups ranging from moderate to radical Islamist lines such as Öze 
Dönüş Platformu, Ay-Der and Mustazaflar Association. Although the Gülenist CSOs were the 
most supported by the AKP government until the first clash occurred between them in 2013, 
most of these CSOs have benefited from various forms of support from the state during AKP 
rule. The example of the Social Support Programme (SODES) illustrates well this policy. 
SODES is a programme designed for development purposes, focusing on impoverished areas 
and underrepresented populations to provide them with support. At the same time, it also 
encourages individuals, CSOs and small businesses to adjust in neoliberal polity and create a 
conservative type of entrepreneurship. Gülen-affiliated CSOs received most of the SODES 
money for many years, and spread across the Kurdish region, recruiting Kurdish youth and 
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imposing a soft Islamist ideology and nationalism in the process. After the first AKP-Gülen 
clash in late 2013, the SODES projects were redirected to other CSOs, including the Kurdish 
Islamists who complied with state practices and joined the National Will Platform67 or the 
local Islamic Civil Society Platforms.  
These platforms, initiated or encouraged by the AKP administration, served as a litmus test 
for the CSOs, whose members benefitted from various ways of financial and political support. 
The state used their alliance to spread the Islamic unity and brotherhood discourse and divert 
people from pro-Kurdish political entities. It should be emphasised that social support 
programmes like SODES only developed dependant financial and political entities, rather 
than empowering civil actors and supporting entrepreneurs who would have independent 
agendas of grassroots movements and mobilisations. As has been the case in previous 
decades, political economy is used as a colonial tool by the hegemonic power. 
The Blessed Birth (Kutlu Doğum) event68 organised by the pro-Hizbullah platform Lovers 
of the Prophet (Peygamber Sevdalıları Platformu) or the celebration of the Conquest of 
Diyarbakır69 in the symbolic capital of Kurdish politics, are two examples of the spread of 
political Islam in the Kurdish public space. The first has become a major public event for the 
Kurdish Islamist groups who participated in the civil war of the 1990s, supporting the state by 
murdering more than a thousand Kurdish civilians. Kurdish Hizbullah remained underground 
for two decades but appeared in public space via CSOs and a political party, Hüda-Par in the 
2000s.70 They proved themselves to be loyal to the state in times of conflict, although they 
have their separate political and social interests. The alliance between the state and Hüda-Par 
reflects the state strategy in this contested political space, consisting of supporting whoever 
serves their agenda, regardless of whether they are true allies or strategic partners. The main 
motivation is to balance powers and divide the Kurdish society, affected by century-long 
suppression and colonial practices.  
The first celebration of the Conquest of Diyarbakır was also organised by the Hizbullah 
affiliate CSOs71 in May 2016, when the four-month-long curfew in the historical district of 
Sur had just ended and the massive destruction of neighbourhoods and historical sites had not 
yet been well documented.72 The destruction of Kurdish towns went hand in hand with this 
creation of a discursive hegemony, which produces symbols and narratives to maintain the 
state’s colonial rule and practices. The Blessed Birth (of Muhammad) or the celebration of the 
Conquest of Diyarbakır can be interpreted as examples of a counter-narrative created and 
backed by the state and its apparatus.73 The Prime Minister of the time, Ahmet Davutoğlu, 
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visited the city during the same period, delivering a talk in front of the Grand Mosque (Ulu 
Cami), describing the conflict as a conquest by referring to the common Islamic history and 
the notion of Islamic unity and brotherhood. His speech was well attended by the Islamist 
CSOs and broadcasted on all national and local TV channels. This analogy does not come 
from a coincidence but a strategic plan to distribute a similar narrative to all levels of society. 
Hence, the invention of the conquest is not a random choice but a well-designed strategy that 
has been transformed into a public event in which the masses can participate, bear witness and 
reproduce the state narrative of a war on terror, which becomes another indicator of colonial 
rule. 
The Blessed Birth and the conquest of Diyarbakır are indeed conceived as responses to the 
well-attended Kurdish New Year celebration, Newroz, and other Kurdish public gatherings 
and events. It shows us that the state hegemony takes place at multiple levels and transforms 
the Kurdish public and political space into one that complies with the state’s political 
interests, which I describe as a colonial practice due to its clear purpose to divert the 
grassroots political reality towards a more state-centric approach to the Kurdish issue. It is not 
surprising that the invention of the Conquest coincided with the massive destruction of Sur 
district. As I have also witnessed how security forces described the destruction as a conquest 
and a battle won after a heavy war in 2016, there is a strong parallel between the discourse 
and practice that state and its local apparatus produce and disseminate. 
SODES or public events like the Blessed Birth and the Conquest of Diyarbakır are not the 
only ways through which the Turkish state and its local apparatus seek to enhance their 
control and legitimacy. There are other instances of this reciprocal relationship between the 
state and their local allies: state-originated wealth such as mass housing construction (TOKI) 
and infrastructural projects (highways, bridges and urban renewal) in the possession of loyal 
Kurdish subcontractors; institutional ranks and positions granted to members of Islamist 
CSOs; public and media visibility for loyal individuals and organisations; and political 
recognition and support of the pro-Hizbullah Hüda-Par and alike political entities. It should be 
noted that the state needs this form of alliance to maintain their rule and legitimise their acts 
in the region. These institutions, individuals and CSOs provide both physical and symbolic 
spaces for the state to interpret, reproduce and maintain a colonial rule in the Kurdish region 
and challenge the insurgent sentiments among the Kurds. This alliance has a high cost as the 
state asks them to demonstrate their loyalty in media and public space, reproduce and 
disseminate the discourse of unity and brotherhood, and support the state through several 
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channels whenever needed. This policy results in more disputes and conflicts in the Kurdish 
public and political space and creates a wide range of reaction from local actors and political 
parties. 
 
Concluding Remarks   
Relying on the paradigm of internal colonisation, this article has argued that this paradigm is 
relevant to analyse the policy of the Turkish state in the Kurdish regions since the beginning 
of the Republican period. Based on the destruction of traditional structures, violent repression 
and discriminatory practices, this policy has turned Turkish Kurdistan into an internal colony, 
despite an assimilationist discourse denying the very existence of a distinct Kurdish identity. 
While this colonial paradigm has started to be discussed by recent works on the Kurdish issue, 
the role of religious policy in the state’s attempts to establish and maintain its colonial rule 
has been little discussed. This article sought to bring an original contribution to the field by 
focusing on the AKP period and questioning the use of Islamic references by the government 
and its supporters in the Kurdish region.  
Religious brotherhood and shared belief in Islam have been used as a tool of political 
mobilisation and legitimisation by the AKP power in order to gain support from the 
conservative and/or Islamist components of the Kurdish society. Emphasizing the shared 
Muslim identity of the Turkish and Kurdish people and stigmatising the supposed lack of 
religious belief of the Kurdish political movement, the governmental actors and the affiliated 
organisations attempted to influence and reshape the public sphere by supporting Islamic civil 
society initiatives and developing new rituals and celebrations, such as the Blessed Birth of 
the Prophet or the Conquest of Diyarbakır. Although at first sight these initiatives seem to 
promote a more participative form of governmentality, their counterpart has been an 
increasing repression of political opponents and the economic marginalisation of the actors 
excluded from these partisan networks. In short, the Islamic stance of the AKP power has 
served the consolidation of the colonial rule in Kurdistan.     
The reception of this policy deserves a thorough analysis. As mentioned in this article, its 
political impact in terms of vote has been limited. However, it has created responses and 
resilience among the Kurds such as Civil Friday Prayers74 and formation of the Democratic 
Islam Congress75 (DIK) and pro-Kurdish Islamic CSOs, a few examples that need further 
investigation in terms of their effectiveness and agencies. Beyond this, to what extent could 
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the AKP policy towards the Kurdish region develop loyalty to the government and the 
Turkish state among the local population? Did they influence religious practices and result in 
an increase of religious conservatism in the local society? And how have the Kurdish political 
movements responded to this use of religious references as a tool of mobilisation? In a 
forthcoming article, I will focus on these questions to argue that the colonial paradigm is not 
only useful to analyse state domination but also provides a relevant theoretical framework to 
understand the multiple layers of agency and resistance among Kurdish society.  
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